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It has become a truism that media defendants in libel cases are being hit by
increasing numbers of ever-growing punitive damage awards. More than a
decade ago commentators began lamenting that "[t]he libel 'megaverdict,'...
virtually unknown until the 1980s," had "become commonplace." 1 That trend
has continued in the intervening years, with reports of substantial libel dam-
ages verdicts coming in on a monthly basis.2 In the face of this development,
one would expect the press and its lawyers to respond with what should be
(from the media's perspective) an appealing and powerful argument: that the
First Amendment precludes the award of punitive damages in libel cases, at
least when the plaintiff is a public figure. Fifteen or twenty years ago, when
massive libel awards first became a notable phenomenon, there was some rea-
son to think that such an argument could be successful. Several state courts
had held that the First Amendment - or analogous free speech provisions in
their state constitutions - barred the award of punitive damages in libel
cases.3 A fair number of commentators (some of them quite prominent) had
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1. Robert D. Sacks & Richard J. Tofel, First Steps Down the Road Not Taken: Emerging Limita-
tions on Punitive Damages, 90 DICK. L. REv. 609, 610 (1986).
2. The most comprehensive available listing of libel verdicts indicates that - excluding a
$200,000,000 punitive award returned in 1997 - the average punitive award returned during the decade
of the 1990s (through 1998) was double that returned during the 1980s. The median award in the 1990s
exceeded the median for the 1980s by 26%. LIBEL DEFENSE RESOURCE CENTER BULL. 4 (Jan. 31,
1999).
3. Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, 330 N.E.2d 161 (Mass. 1975) (citing First Amendment,
"reject[ing] the allowance of punitive damages in this Commonwealth in any defamation action,
whether based on negligence, or reckless or willful conduct"); Tosti v. Ayek, 476 N.E.2d 298, 937
(Mass. 1985) (same); Mass. Ann. Laws c. 231, § 93 (codifying rule); Wheeler v. Oregon, 593 P.2d 777,
788-789 (Ore. 1979) (Oregon constitution "prohibits the award of punitive damages in defamation
cases, unless some other constitutional provision requires that they be allowed"); Lewis v. Or. Beauty
Supply, 733 P.2d 430 (Ore. 1987) (same); Huffman & Wright Logging Co. v. Wood, 817 P.2d 1334
(Ore. Ct. App. 1991) (same); Taskett v. KING Broadcasting Co., 546 P.2d 81, 86 (Wash. 1976) (citing
First Amendment, "juries shall be limited to awarding damages for only the actual damages sus-
tained.... .[U]nder no circumstances will we allow a jury to award punitive damages [in a defamation
case]"); Hauter v. Cowles Publishing Co., 811 P.2d 231, 235 (Wash. App. 1991) (same). See also
Sprouse v. Clay Communications, Inc, 211 S.E.2d 674, 692 (W. Va. 1975) ("regardless of the law in
this State, it would appear that the penumbra of protection of the First Amendment is such that punitive
damages may only be recovered in cases where the award of actual damages is insufficient to dissuade
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reached the same conclusion, albeit typically with little analysis.4 And the Su-
preme Court had not squarely addressed the issue.
Despite this ammunition, however, the press never seriously pursued the
argument that punitive awards for libel are unconstitutional. It appears that the
question whether the First Amendment bars such awards in public-figure libel
cases has been presented to the Supreme Court only once, in a petition that was
filed more than a decade ago.5 And the contention has largely disappeared
from the briefs of media defendants in the lower courts. The reason for this
surrender seems plain enough: like the little girl whose parents fed her broccoli
every night, media defendants - after years of paying punitive judgments (or
of settling cases for amounts that include a premium based on the availability
of punitives) - have come to accept the familiar unpleasantness as part of the
natural order of things.
Against this background, it is all the more surprising to learn that, some
fifteen years ago, five Justices of the Supreme Court essentially concluded that
punitive damages are unconstitutional in all libel cases. Four Justices, in an
opinion for a plurality of the Court in Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Build-
ers, Inc.,6 opined that punitive judgments, "by providing damages unrelated to
the actual harm caused by false statements,... necessarily deter and penalize
truthful statements as well," and therefore do not serve "the state interest in
preventing the special hazards posed by [false] speech.",7 The fifth Justice,
others in like circumstances from committing similar acts in the future"); McHale v. Lake Charles
American Press, 390 So.2d 556, 570 (La. App. 1980) (appearing to follow Sprouse)..
4. See Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Annual Judicial Conference, Third Judicial Circuit, 42
F.R.D. 437, 797-798 (remarks of Paul Freund); Nicole B. Casarez, Punitive Damages in Defamation
Actions: An Area of Libel Law Worth Reforming, 32 DUQ. L. REV. 667, 683 (1994); Marc A. Franklin,
Good Names and Bad Law: A Critique of Libel Law and a Proposal, 18 U.S.F.L. REV. 1, 39 (1983);
Alfred Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 1205, 1252-1253
(1976); Anthony Lewis, New York Times v. Sullivan Reconsidered: Time to Return to "The Central
Meaning of the First Amendment", 83 COLUM. L. REv. 603, 617 (1983); Rodney A. Smolla, Let the
Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American Law of Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 92 (1983); Wil-
liam W. Van Alstyne, First Amendment Limitations on Recovery From the Press -- An Extended Com-
ment on "The Anderson Solution", 25 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 793, 806-807 (1984); Report of the
Committee on Communication Law on Punitive Damages in Libel Actions, 42 Res. of the Ass'n of the
Bar of the City of New York 20, 21 (1987); Report of the Libel Reform Project of the Annenberg
Washington Program 25 (1988).
5. CBS, Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., No. 87-1354, cert. denied, 485 U.S. 933
(1988). As it happened, from the defendant's perspective that case involved extraordinarily unappealing
facts; the defendant had destroyed its files under suspicious circumstances and gave incredible testi-
mony on the stand. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 827 F.2d 1119, 1125-1126, 1127,
1134-1135 (7th Cir. 1987). In addition, the issue was raised elliptically in PG Publishing Co. v. DiSalle,
No. 88-1638, cert. denied, 492 U.S. 906 (1989), which argued briefly that the Court should grant review
if it rejected the Eighth Amendment challenge to punitive damages then pending in Browning-Ferris
Indus. of Vermont v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
6. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
7. Papers of Justice Thurgood Marshall, Collections of the Manuscript Division, Library of Con-
gress, No. 83-18, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., opinion of Brennan, J. (Oct. 30,
1984), at 20-21. The Marshall papers in the collection of the Library of Congress are hereinafter cited
as "MP"; all citations are to the papers' Dun & Bradstreet file except where otherwise noted.
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writing for himself, concluded flatly that "a state may not permit recovery of
punitive damages in a libel action.
'8
How is it, then, that libel defendants continue to find themselves subject to
massive punitive awards? As readers familiar with Dun & Bradstreet may
suspect, the answer is that these defendant-friendly opinions were never pub-
lished; they were withdrawn and are available only in Justice Thurgood Mar-
shall's files at the Library of Congress. But the discovery that the Supreme
Court came very close to holding that the First Amendment bars the award of
punitive damages for libel is grounds for rethinking the question - and cer-
tainly suggests, at a minimum, that the proposition may have some merit. This
essay accordingly follows the path suggested by those vanished opinions. It
begins by proposing that the First Amendment principles actually articulated
by the Court (in its holdings, as opposed to its unpublished drafts) should pre-
clude the award of punitive damages in libel cases brought by public figures.
Looking closely at the evolution of the opinions in Dun & Bradstreet, it then
offers reasons for believing that the Court might be more willing to entertain
that proposition than is generally believed.
I. THE INCONCLUSIVE HISTORY
To appreciate the relevant principles, it is useful to begin with cases that
have the feel of ancient history but continue to shed useful light on the Court's
approach to libel. The Court began the constitutionalization of libel law in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,9 with its famous holding that the First
Amendment requires "a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recov-
ering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct un-
less he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice' - that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not."10 Having reached that conclusion, however, the Court had a much harder
time determining the rules to apply when the plaintiff was not a public official
or was not a public figure at all, or when the plaintiff sought punitive damages.
The Court made its first stab at these problems in Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts,"I a case involving a then-notorious episode in which a Saturday Even-
ing Post article accused the University of Georgia's athletic director of fixing a
football game against the University of Alabama - fighting words indeed.
12
Justice Harlan, writing for a four-Justice plurality that included Justices Clark,
8. MP, opinion ofPowell, J. (Nov. 23, 1984) at 14.
9. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
10. Id. at 279-280.
11. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
12. A consolidated case involved a libel suit growing out of a riot that accompanied James Mere-
dith's enrollment at the University of Mississippi; the plaintiff, locally prominent retired Major General
Edwin Walker, unsuccessfully challenged an Associated Press report that he had taken command of the
violent crowd and led a charge against federal marshals. See id. at 140.
Yale Law & Policy Review
ustice Harlan, writing for a four-Justice plurality that included Justices Clark,
Stewart, and Fortas, concluded that the requirements of New York Times were
too "rigorous" to be applied in that setting. Instead, the Butts plurality would
have held "that a 'public figure' who is not a public official may also recover
damages for a defamatory falsehood whose substance makes substantial danger
to reputation apparent, on a showing of highly unreasonable conduct consti-
tuting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting
ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers."' 3 Of particular note here,
Justice Harlan went on to opine that "there is.. .nothing in any of our past cases
which suggests that compensatory and punitive damages are subject to differ-
ent constitutional standards of misconduct," 14 meaning "that misconduct suf-
ficient to justify the award of compensatory damages also justifies the imposi-
tion of a punitive award."' 5 Butts left the law in confusion, however, because
neither aspect of Justice Harlan's opinion attracted a majority of the Court.
Chief Justice Warren concluded that the New York Times standard should ap-
ply in cases brought by "public figures" as well as by "public officials;'
' 6
Justices Brennan and White agreed in a separate opinion;' 7 and Justices Black
and Douglas characteristically opined that the First Amendment precludes all
libel judgments against the press. 18 None of these Justices specifically
addressed the constitutional rules that govern the award of punitive damages.
The Court failed to resolve this confusion in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc.,19 a case that became the high water mark of Justice Brennan's attempt to
ratchet up the burden on libel plaintiffs. The Rosenbloom plaintiff, delicately
described by Justice Brennan as "a distributor of nudist magazines," 2° was not
a public figure, although the defamatory speech - a radio station's report of
the plaintiff s arrest and the seizure of his nudist (i.e., allegedly obscene) mate-
rials - involved a matter of general interest. Writing for a three-Justice plu-
rality that included Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, Justice Bren-
nan concluded that, so long as the challenged speech involved a matter of
"public or general concern," the plaintiff (whether or not a public figure) had
to satisfy the New York Times standard.21 Two Justices concurred in the result,
Justice Black on the absolutist theory that the First Amendment precludes libel
awards against media defendants even when they knowingly publish false
13. Id. at 155 (plurality opinion).
14. Id. at 160.
15. Id. at 161.
16. Id. at 163 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
17. Id. at 172-74 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
18. Id. at 172 (Black, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Indeed, because five Justices re-
jected the plurality's analysis, Butts has since been cited for proposition that New York Times does gov-
ern suits brought by public figures. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 336-37 (1974).
19. 403 U.S. 29(1971).
20. Id. at 32 (plurality opinion).
21. Id. at 52.
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statements, 22 and Justice White on the ground that "the First Amendment
gives the press and the broadcast media a privilege to report and comment
upon the official actions of public servants in full detail. 23
But for present purposes, the views of the dissenters are most significant.
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Stewart - after uncharitably noting that
"George Rosenbloom, before the events and reports of the events involved
here, was just one of the millions of Americans who live their lives in obscu-
rity' '24 - concluded that the plurality's application of the New York Times
standard undervalued "society's interest in protecting private individuals from
being thrust into the public eye by the distorting light of defamation." 25 Justice
Marshall therefore would have left the states largely free in private-figure cases
"to continue the evolution of the common law of defamation and to articulate
whatever fault standard best suits the State's need" so long as they did not im-
pose "absolute or strict liability. ' 26 But recognizing the threat posed to the
press by libel suits, Justice Marshall offered an alternative method of protect-
ing First Amendment values: he would have altogether precluded the award of
punitive damages for defamation.
Justice Marshall saw "[t]he size of the potential judgment that may be ren-
dered against the press [as] the most significant factor in producing self-
,,27censorship. He added that "[t]he manner in which unlimited discretion may
be exercised is plainly unpredictable. And fear of the extensive awards that
may be given under the doctrine must necessarily produce the impingement on
freedom of the press recognized in New York Times."28 He also observed that
[t]his discretion allows juries to penalize heavily the unorthodox and the unpopular
and exact little from others. Such freewheeling discretion presents obvious and ba-
sic threats to society's interest in freedom of the press. And the utility of the dis-
cretion in fostering society's interest in protecting individuals from defamation is at
best vague and uncertain. These awards are not to compensate victims; they are
only windfalls.
29
Justice Marshall therefore concluded that "[t]he threats to society's interest
in freedom of the press that are involved in punitive and presumed damages
can largely be eliminated by restricting the award of damages to proved, actual
injuries., 30 He "believe[d] that the appropriate resolution of the clash of so-
cietal values here is to restrict damages to actual losses." 3' This conclusion
22. Id. at 57 (Black, J., concurring).
23. Id. at 62 (White, J., concurring).
24. Id. at 78 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 79.
26. Id. at 86.
27. Id. at 82.
28. Id. at 83.
29. Id. at 84.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 86.
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represented a dramatic switch in position by Justice Stewart, who just four
years earlier had joined Justice Harlan's conclusion in Butts that special rules
should not govern the award of punitive damages.
Equally surprising was a similar shift in position by Justice Harlan himself,
who also dissented in Rosenbloom. Although he was not prepared to eliminate
punitive damages altogether, Justice Harlan did declare it "impermissible,
given the substantial constitutional values involved, to fail to contain the
amount of jury verdicts in [defamation] cases within any ascertainable lim-
its."' 32 He explained that "from the standpoint of the individual plaintiff [puni-
tive] awards are windfalls," and concluded
that where these amounts bear no relationship to the actual harm caused, they then
serve essentially as springboards to jury assessment, without reference to the pri-
mary legitimating compensatory function of the system, of an infinitely wide range
of penalties wholly unpredictable in amount at the time of the publication and that
this must be a substantial factor in inducing self-censorship. Further, I find it diffi-
cult to fathom why it may be necessary, in order to achieve its justifiable deterrence
goals, for States to permit punitive damages that bear no discernible relationship to
the actual harm caused by the publication at issue.
33
Justice Harlan therefore would have found that "where the compensatory
scheme seeks to achieve deterrence as a subsidiary byproduct, the desired de-
terrence, if not precisely measured by actual damages, should be informed by
that touchstone if deterrence of falsehood is not to replace compensation for
harm as the paramount goal.",34 As a consequence, he would have held "un-
constitutional, in a private libel case, jury authority to award punitive damages
which is unconfined by the requirement that these awards bear a reasonable
and purposeful relationship to the actual harm done."
35
The Court finally obtained a majority in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,3 6 a
case in which the plaintiff was a private figure (and a sympathetic one at that;
he was a respected lawyer who was labeled a "Leninist" by a publication of the
32. Id. at 64 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 74-75.
34. Id. at 75.
35. Id. at 77. Justice Harlan believed that "the legitimate function of libel law must be understood
as that of compensating individuals for actual, measurable harm caused by the conduct of others." Id. at
66. He therefore referred to the "overriding principle that deterrence is not to be made a substitute for
compensation," Id. at 76, which presumably flowed from his view that "any system that punishes certain
speech is likely to induce self-censorship by those who would otherwise exercise their constitutional
freedom." Id. at 64-65. Having said that, however, Justice Harlan also concluded that "the First
Amendment interest in avoiding self-censorship" does not "always outweigh the state interest in vindi-
cating" the policy of deterrence: "[ilt seems that a legislative choice is permissible which, for example,
seeks to induce, through a reasonable monetary assessment, repression of false material, published with
actual malice, that was demonstrably harmful and reasonably thought capable of causing substantial
harm, but, in fact, was not so fully injurious to the individual attacked. Similarly, the State surely has a
legitimate interest in seeking to assure that its system of compensating victims of negligent behavior
also operates upon all as an inducement to avoid such conduct." Id. at 74.
36. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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John Birch Society37). Justice Powell's majority opinion engaged in a charac-
teristic exercise in balancing. On the one hand, Justice Powell noted that
"punishment of error runs the risk of inducing a cautious and restrictive exer-
cise of the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of speech and press"; 38 on the
other, he recognized that "[t]he legitimate state interest underlying the law of
libel is the compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted on them by de-
famatory falsehood., 39 He therefore split the baby. Suits by public officials
and other public figures would be governed by the demanding New York Times
standard. But for actions by private individuals, Gertz adopted the liability
standard proposed by Justice Marshall's Rosenbloom dissent: "[w]e hold that,
so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for
themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster
of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual. 4 °
This dichotomy was based on a common sense distinction. The Court
opined that "[p]ublic officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly
greater access to the channels of effective communication and hence have a
more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than private individu-
als normally enjoy."'41 The Court also saw "a compelling normative consid-
eration underlying the distinction between public and private defamation
plaintiffs." Although public figures generally "have thrust themselves to the
forefront" and therefore "invite attention and comment," "[n]o such assump-
tion is justified with respect to a private individual.
42
Having thus accepted the fault standard proposed by Justices Marshall and
Stewart in Rosenbloom, the Gertz Court was considerably cagier when it came
to the question of punitive damages. Like Justice Marshall, the majority in
Gertz started from the proposition that the state's only legitimate interest in li-
bel cases involved "compensating injury to the reputation." 43 Having said that,
the Court found:
no justification for allowing awards of punitive damages against publishers and
broadcasters held liable under state-defined standards of liability for defamation. In
most jurisdictions jury discretion over the amounts awarded is limited only by the
gentle rule that they not be excessive. Consequently, juries assess punitive dam-
ages in wholly unpredictable amounts bearing no necessary relation to the actual
harm caused. And they remain free to use their discretion selectively to punish ex-
pressions of unpopular views. Like the doctrine of presumed damages, jury discre-
tion to award punitive damages unnecessarily exacerbates the danger of media self-
37. See id. at 326.
38. Id. at 340.
39. Id. at 341.
40. Id. at 347.
41. Id. at 344.
42. Id. at 344, 345.
43. Id. at 343. See also id. at 349 ("[T]his countervailing state interest extends no further than
compensation for actual injury.").
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censorship, but, unlike the former rule, punitive damages are wholly irrelevant to
the state interest that justifies a neglilrnce standard for private defamation actions.
They are not compensation for injury.
The Court therefore held that "the States may not permit recovery
of.. .punitive damages [in libel cases], at least when liability is not based on a
showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.' 5 The
Court then restated the point in the following terms: "the private defamation
plaintiff who establishes liability under a less demanding standard than that
stated by New York Times may recover only such damages as are sufficient to
compensate him for actual injury.
' 46
Lower courts generally have understood this passage to mean that a libel
plaintiff may obtain punitive damages so long as he or she makes a showing of
actual malice; hence the slew of punitive awards against media defendants. But
the Court's language on the point actually is a model of ambiguity. The
Court's initial statement of its holding is hedged about with the weaselly tem-
porizer "at least" (states may not award punitive damages, "at least" when ac-
tual malice is not established).47 And the Court's summing up was oddly pas-
sive and incomplete; it stated that a plaintiff who did not satisfy New York
Times could obtain only compensatory damages, rather than making the af-
firmative statement that a plaintiff who did make the requisite showing could
obtain punitive damages.
While this all may seem like so much hair-splitting, there is intriguing evi-
dence in the Marshall papers indicating that the Court's ambiguity was deliber-
ate. Justice Powell's initial draft opinion in Gertz stated that "the States may
not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages when liability is based
on a finding of negligence"' 48 and that, "[b]ecause punitive damages perform
much the same functions as criminal penalties, the incidence of their imposi-
tion should be governed by our decision in Garrison v. Louisiana"' 49 - that
44. Id. at 350.
45. Id. at 349 (emphasis added).
46. Id. at 350. The Court applied the same standard to awards of presumed damages, complaining:
The largely uncontrolled discretion of juries to award damages where there is no loss unnec-
essarily compounds the potential of any system of liability for defamatory falsehood to inhibit
the vigorous exercise of First Amendment freedoms" and "invites juries to punish unpopular
opinion rather than to compensate individuals for injury sustained by the publication of a
false fact.
Id. at 349.
47. The New York Times' Anthony Lewis has called attention to the Court's ambiguity, noting that
"[i]f [Gertz] did not go all the way with Justice Marshall [in expressly rejecting punitive damages], that
may be because Justice Powell preferred to test the question by further experience. His phrase 'at least'
in the holding seems to leave open the possibility that punitive damages may in time be found too in-
timidating to free expression to be allowed at all." LEWIS, supra note 4, at 617 (citations omitted).
48. MP, No. 72-617, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., opinion of Powell, J. (Dec. 28, 1973), at 23 (em-
phasis added).
49. Id. at 25 (citing 379 U.S. 64 (1964)).
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is, punitives should be available on a showing of actual malice. 50 This indi-
cates (more or less) clearly that punitive damages were to be available so long
as the plaintiffs proof satisfied New York Times. Justice Powell then circu-
lated a redraft that eliminated this language and substituted the "at least" for-
mulation.51 Three days later, Justices Stewart and Marshall (who, it will be
recalled, opposed punitive awards in all libel cases) joined the opinion.52 This
chronology strongly suggests that the issue was left open to accommodate
those two Justices.
53
The Gertz ambiguity was not clarified by the Court's last word on the sub-
ject, in Dun & Bradstreet. There, the libel plaintiff was not a public figure and
the defamatory speech (an inaccurate credit report) involved matters of purely
private concern. This time writing for a three-Justice plurality (including Jus-
tices Rehnquist and O'Connor), Justice Powell concluded that, "[i]n light of
the reduced constitutional value of speech involving matters of no public con-
cern, we hold that the state interest adequately supports awards of presumed
and punitive damages - even absent a showing actual malice. 54 In Dun &
Bradstreet Justice Powell thus split the baby into thirds, adding an additional
step to the Gertz approach by providing that punitive damages could be
awarded even without satisfaction of the New York Times test so long as the
defamatory speech did not involve a matter of public concern.
55
The plurality explained that Gertz "found that the state interest in awarding
presumed and punitive damages was not 'substantial' in view of their effect on
speech at the core of First Amendment concern. This interest, however, is
50. In Garrison, the Court held that penalties could be imposed under a criminal defamation statute
only if the defendant was shown to have violated the New York Times standard. See 379 U.S. at 74-75.
51. MP, Gert v. Robert Welch, Inc., opinion of Powell, J. (Jan. 11, 1974), at 23-24.
52. MP, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., letter of Stewart, J. (Jan. 14, 1974) MP, Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., letter of Marshall, J. (Jan. 14, 1974).
53. That conclusion also receives support from another unpublished opinion that is available in the
Marshall papers. In an early draft opinion circulated in Dun & Bradstreet, Justice Brennan explained
that, "[a]lthough [the Court in Gertz] had no occasion to consider whether, as Justices MARSHALL and
Stewart had urged in Rosenbloom, presumed and punitive damages in defamation actions are invariably
incompatible with the First Amendment,.. the Court held that such damages could not be awarded 'at
least when liability is not based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the
truth."' MP, Dun & Bradstreet, opinion of Brennan, J. (May 29, 1984), at 8 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at
349). This indicates that Justice Brennan - and, presumably, the members of the Court to whom this
draft was circulated - understood Gertz to have left the question open. Indeed, as is noted below, a
member of the Gertz majority, Justice Blackmun, joined the Brennan opinion in Dun & Bradstreet
without objecting to Justice Brennan's characterization of Gertz.
54. 472 U.S. at 761 (plurality opinion).
55. The other concurring opinions in Dun & Bradstreet did little to dispel the ambiguity of Gertz.
Justice White would have overruled Gertz altogether and cut back on the scope of New York Times (see
id. at 769-774 (White, J., concurring in the judgment)) - although he made the interesting observation
that the Court, in lieu of adding to the plaintiff's burden of proof in New York Times, might have held
that punitive damages should be "scrutinized as Justice Harlan suggested in Rosenbloom,.... or perhaps
even entirely forbidden." Id. at 749. Chief Justice Burger agreed with the plurality that Gertz does not
apply to expression involving matters of private concern while also agreeing with Justice White that
Gertz should be overruled. Id. at 764 (Burger, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
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'substantial' relative to the incidental effect these remedies may have on
speech of significantly less constitutional interest." 56 And responding to the
dissent's assertion that Gertz had held punitive damages "wholly irrelevant" to
the furtherance of any state interest in defamation cases,57 the plurality de-
clared that "what the Gertz language indicates is that the State's interest is not
substantial relative to the First Amendment interest in public speech., 58 This
passage - appearing, in an elliptical sort of way, to endorse the view that pu-
nitive damages do not advance any substantial state interest when speech of
public concern is at issue - can be taken to support the proposition that puni-
tive damages are inappropriate in cases involving such speech. But the plural-
ity never quite brought itself to say that expressly, leaving the Gertz ambiguity
intact.5 9
With Dun & Bradstreet, the Court connected most of the dots on the libel
liability picture. In private-figure, private-speech cases, punitive as well as
compensatory damages are available without a showing of actual malice (un-
der Dun & Bradstreet). In private-figure, public-speech cases, compensatory
56. Id. at 760 (plurality opinion) (emphasis in original).
57. Justice Brennan's dissent (joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens) read Gertz to
hold "that in a defamation action punitive damages, designed to chill and not to compensate, were
'wholly irrelevant' to furtherance of any valid state interest." 472 U.S. at 794 (emphasis in original). See
id. at 779. He therefore opined that "[t]he ready availability and unconstrained application of presumed
and punitive damages in libel actions is too blunt a regulatory instrument to satisfy.. First Amendment
principles, even when the alleged libel does not implicate directly the type of speech at issue in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan." Id. at 778-779.
58. Id. at 761 n.7 (plurality opinion) (emphasis in original). Indeed, in justifying the award of pre-
sumed and punitive damages in cases that do not involve speech on matters of public interest, the plu-
rality explained that
[t]he rationale of the common-law rules has been the experience and judgment of history that
"proof of actual damage will be impossible in a great many cases where, from the character of
the defamatory words and the circumstances of publication, it is all but certain that serious
harm has resulted in fact."...As a result, courts for centuries have allowed juries to presume
that some damage occurred from many defamatory utterances and publications... .This rule
furthers the state interest in providing remedies for defamation by ensuring that those reme-
dies are effective.
Id. at 760-761. Of course, while this explains why presumed damages further the state's goal of com-
pensation, it does not offer a rationale for punitive damages that comports with the state interest in com-
pensating libel victims.
59. The ambiguity is exacerbated, moreover, by various contradictory statements that appear both
in the plurality and in the dissenting opinions. Although the plurality appears to flatly declare that pu-
nitive damages serve no substantial state interest in public speech cases, its opinion elsewhere summa-
rizes Gertz as holding "that a State could not allow recovery of presumed and punitive damages absent a
showing of 'actual malice"' - a restatement of Gertz's studiedly ambiguous formulation. Id. at 756.
Justice Brennan's dissent, meanwhile, condemned "unconstrained" and "unrestrained" punitive dam-
ages in libel cases (id. at 778, 794), language that appears to leave open the possibility of "constrained"
or "restrained" punitive awards. Adding to the mystery, Justice Brennan concluded by opining that
"deterring potential defamation by case-by-case judicial imposition of presumed and punitive damages
on less than a showing of actual malice simply exacts too high a toll on First Amendment values." Id. at
796. This can be read to approve of punitive damages so long as the New York Times standard is met,
although that conclusion runs counter to the longstanding views of Justice Marshall, who, the reader
surely recalls, opposed punitives in all libel cases. As the discussion below (in text at notes 99-149,
infra) suggests, some of this confusion may be explained by the continual rewriting that preceded the
publication of the Dun & Bradstreet opinion.
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damages may be awarded on a showing of fault less than actual malice, but
punitive damages may be awarded (if at all) only on a showing of actual mal-
ice (under Gertz). And in public-figure, public-speech cases, even compensa-
tory damages may not be awarded except upon a finding of actual malice (un-
der New York Times). One part of the picture, however, has yet to be drawn:
the Court has not addressed whether punitive damages ever are available in
public-figure and public-speech cases.
60
II. THE CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE DAMAGES
In this setting, the case against punitive damages in public-figure libel
cases is surprisingly straightforward - and seemingly compelled by principles
already accepted by the Court. Indeed, that case has only gotten stronger in the
years since Dun & Bradstreet, drawing support both from research in the social
sciences and from doctrinal developments relating to the law governing puni-
tive damages in general.
The Individual Interest
The Court already has established the formula that governs the application
of the First Amendment to libel cases: courts must strike a "balance between
the needs of the press and the individual's claim to compensation for wrongful
injury. '61 Looking first to the individual's side of the equation, the Court has
stipulated that the state's principal interest in cases involving speech by public
figures or concerning public issues is compensation rather than punishment or
deterrence. As noted above, the Court in Gertz found that the state interest in
imposing liability for defamation "extends no further than compensation for
actual injury." 62 The Court accordingly concluded that, "[l]ike the doctrine of
60. The Court's more recent, off-hand remarks on punitive damages in libel actions have not
helped clarify matters. In Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979), the Court observed that Gertz "lim-
ited the entitlement to punitive damages, but such damages are still available upon a showing of know-
ing or reckless falsehood" (id. at 163); but the Court also repeated the ambiguous Gertz formulation,
stating that Gertz forbade "the award of punitive damages absent at least reckless disregard of truth or
falsity." Id. at 168 (emphasis added). Other decisions seemingly have indicated that punitive damages
are available. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 774 (1986) (referring to "the
showing of actual malice needed to recover punitive damages under either New York Times or Gertz");
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 49 (1983) (suggesting that Gertz limited punitive awards to "especially
egregious cases"). On the other hand, Justices elsewhere (and more recently) have indicated that puni-
tive damages are not available at all in at least some libel suits. See Pacific Mutual Life. Ins. Co. v.
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 38 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Gertz, "the First Amendment prohibits
awards of punitive damages in certain defamation suits"); id. at 55 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing
Gertz, "the Court has forbidden the award of punitive damages in certain defamation suits by private
plaintiffs"); Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 87 (1988) (O'Connor, J., joined by
Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Gertz, "the Court has forbidden the award of punitive
damages in defamation suits brought by private plaintiffs"). It seems safe to say that the Court has not
thought very deeply about any of these statements.
61. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343.
62. Id. at 349. The Court has continued to cite Gertz as standing for this proposition. See Masson
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presumed damages, jury discretion to award punitive damages unnecessarily
exacerbates the danger of media self-censorship, but, unlike the former rule,
punitive damages are wholly irrelevant to the state interest that justifies a neg-
ligence standard for private defamation actions. They are not compensation
for injury." 63 Similarly, in Dun & Bradstreet the plurality reiterated that "what
the Gertz language indicates is that the State's interest [in awarding punitive
damages] is not substantial relative to the First Amendment interest in public
speech."64 The dissent would have gone even further, opining "that in a defa-
mation action punitive damages, designed to chill and not to compensate, [a]re
'wholly irrelevant' to furtherance of any valid state interest."
65
Of course, notwithstanding the Court's blithe assertions on this point, there
are grounds to question why the state's only legitimate interest in public speech
cases is obtaining compensation for victims of defamation. Outside of the First
Amendment context, after all, the state is thought to have an interest in deter-
rence and retribution that supports the availability of punitive damages. 66 The
plurality in Dun & Bradstreet recognized such an interest where speech that
involves matters of private concern is at issue. And Justice Harlan, an iconic
figure for many of the Court's conservatives, was of the view that deterrence
67has a role to play, albeit a limited one, even where public speech is involved.
On balance, however, although the Gertz and Dun & Bradstreet Courts
failed to explain themselves very clearly, they were correct in concluding that
the state interest in punishing speech that defames public figures is at best
weak. First, errors in such speech are often, in effect, self-correcting. The
Court has recognized that public figures who voluntarily "invite attention and
comment" also typically have substantial "access to the channels of effective
communication," 68 which allows them to respond to inaccurate allegations.
Indeed, the more prominent the victim of the defamation, the likelier it is that
he or she will attract attention when rebutting a charge. And while there is
some truth to the observation that the response never attracts as much attention
as the allegation, 69 the fact remains that a White House aide who is falsely ac-
cused of spousal abuse, 70 or a presidential candidate who is inaccurately al-
v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 516 (1991).
63. Id. at 350.
64. 472 U.S. at 761 n.7 (emphasis in original).
65. Id. at 794 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
66. See, e.g., BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 669, 568 (1996).
67. See note 35, supra.
68. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345, 344. See Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S.
657, 687 (1989).
69. See, e.g., Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 46 (plurality opinion) ("Denials, retractions, and corrections
are not 'hot' news, and rarely receive the prominence of the original story.").
70. See, e.g., H. Kurtz, Blumenthals Get Apology, Plan Lawsuit; Web Site Retracts Story on
Clinton Aide, WASH. POST (Aug. 12, 1997), at All; H. Kurtz, Cyber-Libel and the Web Gossip-
Monger; Matt Drudge's Internet Rumors Spark Suit by White House Aide, WASH. POST (Aug. 15,
1997), at G1. Of course, it helps when the accuser is Matt Drudge.
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leged to have been arrested for cocaine use, 71 will have relatively little diffi-
culty getting their rebuttals on the front page.
Second, any state interest in deterrence is likely to be amply served by the
award of compensatory damages. 72 That is particularly so because compensa-
tory damages in the libel setting are available for injury to reputation and for
pain and suffering, a standard that is flexible enough to allow for substantial
judgments that will have a considerable deterrent effect. 73 In the public figure
setting, moreover, there is little danger that wrongdoing will go undiscovered
and unremedied, which is the usual justification for awarding punitives as a
deterrent; the subject of a defamatory remark can be counted on to hear of it.
Third, the very idea of state-imposed punishment seems out of place when
the challenged conduct is speech that is critical of a public figure and involves
an issue of public importance. To be sure, as a matter of theory false and de-
famatory statements are valueless and constitutionally unprotected, which is
why defamation actions are permissible in the first place. But critical remarks
about public figures are an essential element of political discourse and a desir-
able aspect of serious journalism. It thus seems reasonable in this context to
read the First Amendment as casting substantial doubt on the state's right to
punish participants in this sort of commentary. After all, it is the modem the-
ory of the First Amendment that, rather than punishment, "the fitting remedy
for evil counsels is good ones."74 And as Justice Harlan observed in a slightly
different context, "[a]ny nation which counts the Scopes trial as part of its
heritage cannot so readily expose ideas to sanctions on a jury finding of fal-
sity.' '75 At a minimum, this all serves to diminish the state-interest side of the
equation.
71. See, e.g., H. Kurtz, Bush Accuser is Said to Be Ex-Convict; Publisher Halts Release of Biogra-
phy of GOP Candidate, WASH. POST (Oct. 22, 1999), at C1; L. Weeks, Editor Quits in Bush Bio Imbro-
glio; Incident Raises Questions About Publishers' Safeguards, WASH. POST (Oct. 27, 1999), at Al. Of
course, it helps when the accuser has served time in prison for trying to kill his former employer.
72. See, e.g., Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 312-313 (1986) ("dam-
ages that compensate for actual harm ordinarily suffice to deter"); Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 94
(1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
73. "Medical expense and economic loss do have some objective reality but the warrant to add
pain and suffering gives the jury immediate freedom to price the injury subjectively." Kalven, The Jury,
the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 158, 161 (1958). See Smolla, supra,
132 U. PA. L. REV. at 92; Sacks & Tofel, supra, 90 DICK. L. REV. at 612. In one notorious libel case,
for example, the Philadelphia Inquirer was held liable for $2.5 million for injury to reputation even
though the plaintiff introduced no evidence that he had suffered any actual economic harm. Sprague v.
Walter, 656 A.2d 890, 896, 925 (Pa. Super. 1995).
74. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
75. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 406 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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The Danger of Overdeterrence
On the other side of the balance, the danger that punitive damages will in
fact lead to overdeterrence - and consequently chill freedom of expression -
is particularly acute in public-figure cases. Indeed, the availability of punitive
damages in such cases poses unique and obvious dangers to protected speech,
dangers that derive from the nature of jury decision-making regarding puni-
tives, from the impact of punitive judgments on speakers, and from the nature
of the affected speech.
As an initial matter, the character of the decision-making process where
punitives are concerned makes it inevitable that there often will be erroneous
and excessive awards in public-figure libel cases. In fact, all public-figure
cases, which require application of the New York Times standard, present a
substantial prospect of jury confusion. The Court has recognized that "[t]he
phrase 'actual malice' is unfortunately confusing in that it has nothing to do
with bad motive or ill will."'76 And Justice Ginsburg, while still on the D.C.
Circuit, explained that "[e]xperience supports the intuition that juries have con-
siderable trouble 'distinguishing actual malice from mere negligence.' . . . [a]s
Judge Bork has observed, '[t]he evidence is mounting that juries do not give
adequate attention to limits imposed by the first amendment and are much
more likely to find for the plaintiffs in a defamation case.' 77 The problem is
greatly compounded when punitive damages are added to the mix; because the
jury in a public-figure suit is instructed that both liability and entitlement to
78punitive damages turn on a finding of recklessness, jurors are likely to be-
lieve that punitive damages may be awarded whenever a verdict is returned for
the plaintiff in a public-figure libel case. 79 That such awards are not in fact in-
variably returned simply points up the hit-or-miss aspect of punitives, a phe-
nomenon that has a powerful in terrorem effect on potential defendants.
More generally, one need not share Mark Twain's politically incorrect
view - that the jury "would prove the most ingenious and infallible agency
76. Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 666 n.7 (citing Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52
n.18 (1971)).
77. Tavoulareas v. Piro, 817 F.2d 762, 807 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(citations omitted). Experience bears out this observation. During the period 1990-1998, defendants
were only marginally more successful in trials in which actual malice was the standard than they were in
cases in which the plaintiff had to prove negligence: defendants were successful in 41.7% of actual
malice cases and 40% of negligence cases. LIBEL DEFENSE RESOURCE CENTER BULL. 17 (Jan. 31,
1999). Over the entire period from 1980-1998, defendants won 39.7% of cases tried under an actual
malice standard and 32.8% of cases tried under a negligence standard. Id.
78. The instructions given in the case involving the Philadelphia Inquirer that is noted above are
typical. See n.73, supra. The jury was told that it could award punitive damages if it found that the
defendant "act[ed] with a bad motive or... with reckless indifference to the interest of others." Sprague,
656 A.2d at 923.
79. See Cdsarez, supra, 32 DUQ. L. REV. at 687, 691; Smolla, supra, 132 U. PA. L. REV. at 91; Van
Alstyne, supra, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 797.
Vol. 19:165, 2000
Punitive Damages in Libel Suits
for defeating justice that human wisdom could contrive '80 - to recognize that
juries are capable of making serious errors. As the leading scholars of the
subject have observed,
A jury is composed of untrained citizens, drawn randomly from the eligible popu-
lation, convened briefly for a particular trial, entrusted with great official powers,
permitted to deliberate in secret, to render a verdict without explanation, and, with-
out any accountability then or ever, to return to private life.
81
While a whole constellation of considerations leads judges to arrive (in
theory) at well-reasoned and objectively "correct" decisions, individual mem-
bers of a jury have no such incentives. Students of the jury thus have found
that juries sometimes "consider[] extralegal factors in determining liability and
punitive awards." 82 Moreover, it seems clear from the work of social scientists
that juries may be biased against corporate defendants, a category that includes
newspapers and broadcasters. 83 Yet in libel suits, by definition every error in
the award of punitive damages means that speech is being wrongfully (or ex-
cessively) punished.
This danger of error that is inherent in all jury decisionmaking is made
considerably worse by the nature of the question posed to the jury when puni-
tive damages are at issue. While juries presumably are most effective in mak-
ing factual determinations that are within the common experience of lay men
and women, determining the amount of punitive damages to award calls for the
exercise of the kind of sentencing discretion that generally is the province of a
judge.84 Justice Breyer thus has observed, correctly, that jurors who are asked
to consider the award of punitive damages are expected "to act, at least a little,
like legislators or judges, for [awarding punitive damages] permits them, to a
certain extent, to create public policy and to apply that policy, not to compen-
80. M. Twain, ROUGHING IT 256 (Signet ed. 1980) (emphasis in original). Twain added that "[t]he
jury system puts a ban upon intelligence and honesty, and a premium upon ignorance, stupidity, and
perjury. It is a shame that we must continue to use a worthless system because it was good a thousand
years ago." Id at 257 (emphasis in original). Or to paraphrase Judge Jerome Frank, "the jury applies
law it doesn't understand to facts it can't get straight." Vidmar, Foreward: Empirical Research and the
Issue of Jury Competence, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1 (1989) (footnote omitted) (citing J. Frank,
COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE (1945)).
81. M. Saks, JURY VERDICTS: THE ROLE OF GROUP SIZE AND SOCIAL DECISION 6 (1977). See H.
Kalven & H. Zeisel, THE AMERICAN JURY 3 (Phoenix ed. 1970).
82. M. Selvin & L. Picus, THE DEBATE OVER JURY PERFORMANCE: OBSERVATIONS FROM A
RECENT ASBESTOS CASE ix (1987).
83. Greene, On Juries and Damage Awards: The Process of Decisionmaking, 52 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 224, 246 (1989). See A. Chin & M. Peterson, DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY POCKETS:
WHO WINS IN COOK COUNTY JURY TRIALS 42-45 (1985) (in personal injury trials, corporate and gov-
ernmental defendants more likely to be found liable and to be required to pay larger damages); Hans &
Ermann, Responses to Corporate Versus Individual Wrongdoing, 13 LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 151
(1989) (same).
84. Ellis, Punitive Damages, Due Process, and the Jury, 40 ALA. L. REV. 975, 1004-1006 (1989).
Indeed, as the Court has noted, "highly discretionary calculations that take into account multiple factors
are necessary in order to set civil penalties.... These are the kinds of calculations traditionally per-
formed by judges." Tullv. United States, 481 U.S. 412,427 (1987).
Yale Law & Policy Review Vol. 19:165, 2000
sate a victim, but to achieve a policy-related objective outside the confines of
the particular case."
85
Jurors judging a punitive damages case thus labor under a significant
handicap that derives both from the nature of the institution and from the char-
acter of the punitive damages decision. A jury considers its case in isolation; it
lacks the information and experience needed to place the particular defendant's
actions in context, and typically has no knowledge of the range of punishments
to which comparable wrongdoers have been subjected. A jury is therefore far
less able than a judge to devise a sanction that is appropriately proportioned to
the relative wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct.
86
Of course, juries are expected to follow the judge's instructions. But
"[j]ury instructions [regarding punitive damages] typically leave the jury with
wide discretion in choosing amounts."87 And even apart from that problem,
the Supreme Court has recognized in the punitive damages context "the possi-
bility that a jury will not follow those instructions and may return a lawless,
biased, or arbitrary verdict.' '88 There would be nothing surprising in that: "jury
researchers are nearly unanimous in giving the jury poor marks for its under-
standing of legal instructions.
'" 89
Punitive damages thus present a set of related dangers for free speech in
public-figure cases. The complexity of the actual malice standard ensures that
85. BMW, 517 U.S. at 596 (Breyer, J., concurring).
86. Moreover, the difficulty that a jury will have in reaching a correct decision is compounded by a
feature of punitive damages regimes that almost seems calculated to induce an incorrect decision: in
many states, juries are informed of the defendant's wealth, and plaintiff's counsel may urge the jury to
transfer some of that wealth to the plaintiff. It has long been a commonplace that juries bedazzled by
evidence of the size and financial condition of a wrongdoer and feeling "antipathy to a wealthy, out-of-
state corporate defendant" may surrender to "redistributionist impulses." TXO, 509 U.S. at 468-469
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). This unsurprising temptation means
that evidence of wealth "may do more harm than good; jurymen may be more interested in divesting
vested interests than in attempting to fix penalties which will make for effective working of the ad-
monitory function." Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1191 (1931).
See Abraham & Jeffries, Punitive Damages and the Rule of Law: The Role of Defendant's Wealth, 18 J.
LEGAL STUD. 415, 424 (1989); Ellis, supra, 40 ALA. L. REV. at 996.
87. Honda, 512 U.S. at 432. As the Court has noted, most states "requir[e] only that the damages
awarded be reasonably necessary to vindicate the State's legitimate interests in punishment and deter-
rence." BMW, 517 U.S. at 568.
88. Honda, 512 U.S. at 433.
89. Hans, The Jury's Response to Business and Corporate Wrongdoing, 52 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 177, 185 (1989) (footnote omitted). The evidence is overwhelming that juries often simply do
not understand instructions. See, e.g., V. Hans & N. Vidmar, JUDGING THE JURY 120-127 (1986); Bro-
deur, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744 (1959); Ellis, supra, 40 ALA. L.
REV. at 1006-1007; Elwork & Sales, Jury Instructions, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL
PROCEDURE 280 (S. Kassin & L. Wrightsman eds., 1985); Forston, Judges's Instructions: A Quantita-
tive Analysis of Jurors' Listening Comprehension, 18 TODAY'S SPEECH 34 (Nov. 1970); Hans, supra,
52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. at 185 & n.54 (citing unpublished research); Kessler, The Social Psychol-
ogy of Jury Deliberations, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL OVERVIEW 69, 83 (R. Simon
ed., 1975); Steele & Thornburg, Jury Instructions: A Persistent Failure to Communicate, 67 N.C.L.
REV. 77, 80 (1988). For anecdotal examples, see Kalven, The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury
Damage Award, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 158, 162-163 (1958).
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many verdicts will be returned in error. And the virtually unconstrained elas-
ticity of the punitive damages determination gives jurors what the Court has
described as a largely unreviewable license to "use their discretion selectively
to punish expressions of unpopular views."90 This is not a hypothetical dan-
ger. The Court has warned that juries are "unlikely to be neutral with respect
to the content of speech" and may seek to suppress "those vehement, caustic,
and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks.. .which must be protected if the
guarantees of the First Amendment are to prevail."91 Allowing the award of
punitive damages when the jury is sufficiently outraged by the defendant's
conduct thus invites the imposition of punishment "on the basis of the jurors'
taste or views, or perhaps on the basis of the dislike of a particular expres-
sion."92 This is a danger, of course, that is greatest in cases that involve public
speech about public figures, where statements are most likely to be controver-
sial and the jury is most likely to have a viscerally negative reaction; selective
punishment of unpopular views is not much of a threat when the challenged
speech involves Dun & Bradstreet's credit reports. Judicial review, mean-
while, is an inadequate safeguard against the suppression of unpopular speech:
judges - who may themselves have been the subject of the defendant's "caus-
tic" and "unpleasantly sharp attacks" - may lack both the will and the institu-
tional ability to look behind the jury's return of a punitive award.
93
This likelihood of unpredictable, erroneous, and sometimes effectively un-
reviewable punitive judgments is sure to have a significant impact on the will-
ingness of speakers to engage in controversial speech. After all, it is the fun-
damental assumption of New York Times that the prospect even of
compensatory damages will curtail expression. But punitive awards, for which
availability is not constrained by meaningful jury instructions and which may
be limitless in amount, compound this danger exponentially. In an era when
90. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350.
91. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 510 (1984) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
92. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988).
93. Courts in Pennsylvania provide a suggestive illustration of the problem. In the libel suit against
the Philadelphia Inquirer mentioned above (at note 73), the jury returned a punitive award in the aston-
ishing amount of $31.5 million, reduced on appeal to a still remarkable $21.5 million. Sprague, 656
A.2d at 929-30. It is not surprising that the Pennsylvania courts were unsympathetic to the defense; the
Inquirer historically has engaged in vigorous reporting about corruption and other failures of the Penn-
sylvania judiciary. Indeed, it had published several articles and editorials that were critical of the trial
judge hearing the case against it in Sprague, including one revealing that he had eight relatives on the
common pleas court payroll. See Ditzen & Biddle, Review board official provides for family, in Above
the Law, THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER 16 (May 15-17, 1993) (The judge explained: "Do we only want
orphans working for the courts? People who don't have families?"). Indeed, three justices of the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court initiated libel actions against the Inquirer or its sister publication, The Philadel-
phia Daily News, during the pendency of the Sprague suit. See Lounsberry, Judge Orders Removal of
Larsen; Justice is Spared a Term in Prison, THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER Al (June 14, 1994). The
plaintiff in one of those cases, however, was removed from the court after his conviction on felony
charges.
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eight- and even nine-figure punitive judgments are not surprising, every critical
article potentially becomes a bet-the-company proposition for the publisher.
And that is particularly true of controversial speech that is likely to offend a
jury's sensibilities. The inevitable result is the limitation of speech. That out-
come should be unacceptable in cases where the First Amendment requires the
highest level of protection because "the speech is of public concern and the
plaintiff is a public figure," 94 and where, as a result, First Amendment princi-
ples demand ...precision of regulation."'
95
In sum, weighed against the significant danger to free expression, the
state's interest in awarding punitive damages in public-figure libel cases is in-
substantial. There is no doubt that "speech on public affairs occupies the high-
est rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values[] and is entitled to special
protection. ' 96 Under the Court's doctrine, the state's principal concern is with
compensation, a consideration that applies with special force when the plaintiff
is a public figure who may readily get his or her rebuttal before the public. And
the uncertainty that attends both the imposition of punitive liability and the se-
lection of a particular punishment "can only dissuade protected speech., 97 The
constitutional balance accordingly requires the preclusion of punitive damages
in public-figure cases. In this area, only the elimination of punitive damages
suffices to "carve out an area of 'breathing space' so that protected speech is
not discouraged.,
98
Considerations of logic and symmetry support this conclusion. As noted
above, under Dun & Bradstreet, punitive as well as compensatory damages are
available in private-speech cases without a showing of actual malice; in public-
speech, private-figure cases, Gertz provides that compensatory damages may
be awarded upon a showing of fault less than actual malice, but punitive dam-
ages may be imposed (if at all) only upon a showing of actual malice; and
where the victim of the defamation is a public figure, even compensatory dam-
ages may not be assessed except upon a finding of actual malice. This hierar-
chy suggests that punitive damages should not be available at all in public-
figure cases, where the strictest rules must apply.
94. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986).
95. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982) (citation omitted).
96. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 759 (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). See,
e.g., Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 50; Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S.
485, 503-504 (1984).
97. Id. at 686.
98. Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 686. See Bose, 466 U.S. at 513; Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340.
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III. THE PRACTICALITIES OF THE ARGUMENT AGAINST PUNITIVE
DAMAGES: THE CURIOUS CASE OF DUN & BRADSTREET
All of this goes to show that there is a strong theoretical and academic case
to be made for the elimination of punitive damages in public-figure libel cases.
But that conclusion begs the practical question: is there any real possibility, at
this late date, that a relatively conservative Supreme Court would be willing to
find substantial new content to the First Amendment? On the face of it, the
prospect appears farfetched. But closer examination suggests several reasons
to believe that the Justices might be open to the possibility - not the least of
them the fact that the Court already has come surprisingly close to applying
the First Amendment in precisely that way. Indeed, the evolution of the
Court's opinion in Dun & Bradstreet reveals that the Justices saw nothing at all
outlandish in the suggestion that punitive damages should have no role to play
in any libel cases.
The Court's Silent Majority To Eliminate Punitive Damages
Dun & Bradstreet was a defamation action brought by a private figure; the
challenged speech involved matters of purely private concem. 99 The jury
found for the plaintiff, awarding $50,000 in compensatory and $300,000 in pu-
nitive damages. The Vermont Supreme Court upheld the verdict, concluding
that the New York Times protections are not available to non-media defen-
dants.100
The case was first argued to the Supreme Court on March 21, 1984.101
Although the Marshall papers do not indicate the Court's initial vote, they do
show that the Justices had a difficult time coming to rest in the case. °2 In any
99. See 472 U.S. at 751-752 (plurality opinion). In particular, the defendant, a credit reporting
agency, falsely reported to certain of its subscribers that the plaintiff had filed for bankruptcy.
100. Id. at 753.
101. It appears that the Court initially voted to deny certiorari, but granted review in the case after
Justice White circulated a dissent from the denial arguing that the lower courts were split on the ques-
tion whether the holding of Gertz applied in suits by private plaintiffs against non-media defendants.
See MP, dissent of White, J. (Oct. 13, 1983); MIP, memorandum to the Conference of Burger, C.J. (Oct.
21, 1983) (conflict in lower courts noted by White "leads me to give a reluctant 'grant').
102. Ordinarily, the Justices would vote at the first conference after argument and the case then
would be assigned to one of the Justices in the majority, without any written exchange between the Jus-
tices. In Dun & Bradstreet, however, Justice Stevens circulated a post-conference note stating that,
"[a]fter further reflection, I have decided to vote to reverse." MP, letter of Stevens, J. (March 26, 1983).
Justice O'Connor followed with a note stating that, "[o]n further reflection about this case, I am not in-
clined to dismiss it as improvidently granted," although she indicated that her view on that point "may
be in the minority." On the merits, she opined that the "commercial transfer of facts by a non-media
defendant" deserves "only the most modest First Amendment protection." She therefore indicated that
she would vote to affirm. MP, letter of O'Connor, J. (March 28, 1984). Justice Powell then circulated a
letter indicating that he agreed with O'Connor and that, "[slince this case will be decided," he would
vote to affirm by "treating D&B as belonging to a specialized category of disseminators of informa-
tion." MP, Letter of Powell, J. (March 28, 1984). Finally, on that same date, the Chief Justice circu-
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event, it appears that a majority eventually voted in favor of the defendant; on
May 29, 1984, Justice Brennan circulated a draft majority opinion that would
have reversed the lower court's decision. That he did so almost certainly
means that at least five Justices had tentatively voted to reverse and that Justice
Brennan, as the senior Justice in the majority, had assigned himself responsi-
bility for writing the opinion.' °3 This draft focused on and rejected the lower
court's analysis, concluding that there should be no "distinction between 'me-
dia' and 'nonmedia' defendants for purposes of First Amendment principles
applicable to defamation suits. '' 1 4 Because the jury had awarded presumed
and punitive damages without the finding of actual malice required (at a mini-
mum) by Gertz, Justice Brennan would have reversed. 0 5
Justice Brennan's opinion was quickly joined by Justices Marshall, Black-
mun, and Stevens.' 6 But Justice Brennan was unable to obtain the decisive
fifth vote. On June 15, 1984, Justice Powell circulated a dissent opining that
private speech of the sort peddled by Dun & Bradstreet - challenged in "a
purely private defamation action against a commercial credit reporting
agency"'07 - does not raise "the concerns that activated New York Times and
Gertz."10 8 Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor joined the dissent. 10 9 Chief Jus-
tice Burger, meanwhile, declined to take a position on the merits, asking Jus-
tice Brennan to "show [that] I would [dismiss the certiorari petition as im-
providently granted]."
'10
This left Justice White, who presumably had been the fifth vote at confer-
ence to reverse. On June 25, 1984, however, he circulated a note stating that,
"[a]t this moment, I am up in the air on this case." Although he expressed
sympathy for Justice Powell's views, Justice White also believed that the Pow-
ell dissent narrowed Gertz and he was "unprepared to take that step without a
lated a memorandum stating that the case would be discussed at the Court's forthcoming conference.
MP, memorandum to the Conference of Burger, C.J. (March 28, 1984). This back-and-forth suggests
that the Court might initially have voted to dismiss the case as improvidently granted, but that a second
conference was needed to address the merits when it became clear that the requisite five Justices wanted
the case decided.
103. It seems improbable that Chief Justice Burger voted with the majority because it would be
most uncharacteristic of him to assign a First Amendment libel case to Justice Brennan.
104. MP, opinion of Brennan, J. (May 29, 1984), at 3.
105. Id. at 11-20. As is noted above, in the course of his analysis Justice Brennan acknowledged
that Gertz left open the question whether punitive damages ever were available in libel cases. See note
53, supra. Without explicitly answering the question, Justice Brennan expressed considerable skepti-
cism about the propriety of punitive awards in this context, noting that many of the Court's decisions in
other settings "reflect a recognition that 'the alleged deterrence achieved by punitive damage awards is
likely to be outweighed by the costs."' Id. at 9 (citation omitted).
106. MP, letter of Marshall, J. (May 30, 1984); MP, letter of Stevens, J. (June 4, 1984); MP, letter
ofBlackmun, J. (June 15, 1984).
107. MP, opinion ofPowell. J. (June 15, 1984), at 5.
108. Id. at 6.
109. MP, letter of O'Connor, J. (June 18, 1984); MP, letter of Rehnquist, J. (June 20, 1984).
110. MP, letter of Burger, C.J. (June 19, 1984) ("As of now, please show I would DIG.").
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reargument." On the other hand, Justice White also was unwilling to join Jus-
tice Brennan's opinion, "with its reaffirmation of Gertz." Justice White ac-
cordingly proposed that the case be reargued, adding that if it were not he
would "join the Court's judgment of reversal, which I think is more consistent
with existing precedent than an affirmance would be."'' This proposal to
have the case reargued quickly attracted support, and the case was set for rear-
gument the following term.
The case was argued for the second time on October 3, 1984. Although the
Marshall papers again do not indicate the vote at the Court's conference, it ap-
pears that the Justices divided as they had after the first argument, with five
supporting reversal. Thus, Justice Brennan circulated a draft majority opinion
on October 30, 1984.
This opinion was similar to the one he had written the previous spring, re-
jecting the contention that either the private nature of the speech or the non-
media status of the defendant made Gertz inapplicable.' 12 As for punitive
damages, Justice Brennan did not, in so many words, conclude that they were
unconstitutional in all libel cases. But his opinion left little doubt that he took
that view. He noted that, after the decision in Gertz, the Court had "followed
[Gertz's] reasoning with respect to damages in excess of actual harm in analo-
gous areas of the law," citing several decisions in which the Court had flatly
precluded the award of punitives.113 He opined that "[t]hese cases, like Gertz,
reflect a recognition that 'the alleged deterrence achieved by punitive damage
awards is likely outweighed by the costs - such as the encouragement of un-
necessary litigation and the chilling of desirable conduct ....." ,114 He stated
that, "when the threat of unpredictable and disproportionate damages induces
potential speakers to refrain from speaking, both the speaker and society as a
whole are losers."'1 15 He cited with apparent approval the holdings of several
state courts "that the First Amendment, or comparable state constitutional pro-
visions, bars [punitive] damages in cases where the party injured by defama-
tion recovers adequate compensatory damages." ' 16 And he concluded that
the state interest in redressing the harm caused by false statements in the defama-
tion context is fully served by damages that compensate for actual injury. Uncon-
strained awards of presumed and punitive damages, in contrast, do more than re-
quire speakers to bear the costs of their false and harmful statements; by providing
damages unrelated to the actual harm caused by false statements, such awards nec-
111. MP, letter of White, J. (June 25, 1984).
112. MP, opinion of Brennan, J. (Oct. 30, 1984); at 11-21.
113. Id. at 9 (citing Electrical Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42 (1979) (punitive damages unavailable
for a union's breach of its duty of fair representation under the Railway Labor Act) and Newport v. Fact
Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981) (municipalities immune from punitive damages in suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983)).
114. Id. (citation omitted).
115. Id. at 10.
116. Id.atl0n.3.
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essarily deter and penalize truthful statements as well.
1 17
Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens again quickly joined the Bren-
nan opinion.1
1 8
Justice Powell circulated his dissent on November 23, 1984."9 As he had
the previous spring, Justice Powell opined that the speech in Dun & Bradstreet
deserved less protection than that in Gertz because it was "purely private" and
did "not appear in a newspaper or magazine of general or regular circula-
tion. ,120 He accordingly was of the view that the Court had "to strike a new
balance between the interests of the speaker here and the state interest in pro-
viding a legal remedy for defamatory falsehood."'
121
In striking that balance, however, Justice Powell staked out dramatic new
ground where punitive damages were concerned. He took Gertz to stand for
the proposition that the state interest in remedying defamation "does not aim to
reward victims of falsehood with damages in excess of the harm they have suf-
fered, for the legitimate 'state interest extends no further than compensation for
actual injury. ' ' 122 But punitive damages, he emphasized, "unlike presumed
damages, are not intended to compensate the tort victim."' 23 As a conse-
quence, "[i]n view of the serious constitutional concerns that punitive damages
pose and the absence of any state interest in providing windfalls to libel plain-
tiffs," Justice Powell would have held "that a State may not permit recovery of
punitive damages in a libel action.', 124 He would have taken a different tack as
117. Id.at 20.
118. MP, letter of Stevens, J. (Oct. 31, 1984); MP, letter of Marshall, J. (Nov. 1, 1984); MP, letter
ofBlackmun, J. (Nov. 1, 1984).
119. This opinion actually was both a dissent in part and a partial concurrence because, as is noted
below, Justice Powell would have set aside the punitive award.
120. MP, opinion of Powell, J. (Nov. 23, 1984), at 8.
121. Id.at9-10.
122. Id. at 10 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 13-14. In reaching his conclusion on punitive damages, Justice Powell borrowed heav-
ily from due process concepts, observing that, "[iun levying fines under the name of punitive damages,
neither courts nor juries are required to observe the procedural safeguards that the Fifth, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendments require in criminal proceedings"; that "the courts must afford the defendant
some of these protections whenever the purpose is punishment"; and that "[blecause it guards against
wrongful and arbitrary punishments, the Due Process Clause is a constitutional protection no less neces-
sary and vital to our civil liberties than is the First Amendment." Id. at 11. See id. at 12-13 (noting that
many jurisdictions had modified the common law rules governing punitive damages, that entitlement to
such damages in England was severely limited, and that "[i]t is time we follow these overdue develop-
ments"). Indeed, Justice Brennan's response characterized the Powell opinion as "hold[ing] that an
award of punitive damages would be unconstitutional as a denial of due process." MP, opinion of
Brennan, J. (Jan. 17, 1985), at 15 n.5. But however much he was influenced by notions of due process,
Justice Powell's conclusion necessarily had a substantial First Amendment component. It is difficult to
believe that Justice Powell meant to suggest that all punitive damage awards are unconstitutional, a
conclusion that would mark a truly revolutionary change in the law. To the contrary, it was "the ab-
sence of any legitimate state interest in providing windfalls to libel plaintiffs" - an absence that was
derived from Gertz's First Amendment-based conclusions about the primacy of the state interest in
compensation - that pushed Justice Powell to the conclusion that punitive damages should not be re-
coverable "in a libel action." MP, opinion of Powell, J. (Nov. 23, 1984), at 14.
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to presumed damages, however; because "their purpose is to compensate, not
to punish or deter,"'1 25 Justice Powell would have held them available "even
without proof of actual malice."
'126
On December 14, Justice Brennan responded to the Powell dissent. He
again did not expressly declare that punitive damages either should or should
not be unconstitutional in libel cases. But he also did not explicitly disagree
with Justice Powell on that point. To the contrary, he asserted only that Justice
Powell was wrong in distinguishing between punitive and presumed damages,
declaring that the dissent's "rationale for prohibiting punitive damages in libel
cases is the same as that relied upon by the Court in Gertz for prohibiting pre-
sumed damages in the absence of a showing of actual malice."
' 127
But this was as far as Justice Brennan was able to go in reformulating libel
law because he again was unable to attract a fifth vote for reversal. On De-
cember 20, 1984, Chief Justice Burger directed a note to Justice Powell indi-
cating that he and Justice Rehnquist were "not ready to drop punitive dam-
ages," that he had "trouble with the media, non-media" distinction, and that he
would "await further writing." 128 He followed this with another note on De-
cember 27, 1984, reiterating that he could not "accept either the media-
nonmedia dichotomy or the abolition of punitive damages in libel cases, espe-
cially the latter. So, very likely I will agree with no one except myself.'
129
And more troubling from Justice Brennan's perspective, Justice White - the
putative fifth vote for reversal - sent a note of his own on December 26,
1984, stating that "[i]t will be some time before I am ready in this case., 130 A
month later, on January 25, 1985, Justice White dropped his other shoe,
circulating a cranky dissent that took issue with the entire enterprise begun in
New York Times, maintained that Gertz should be overruled, and concluded
that the Gertz rule should in any event be inapplicable when the speech at issue
does not involve a matter of public importance.
131
125. Id. at 14. Curiously, Justice Powell did not read Justice Brennan's opinion altogether to pre-
clude the award of punitive damages; Justice Powell took the majority to task because, "by allowing
punitive damages in some libel cases, the Court neglects important constitutional interests that can be
protected without harming the State's legitimate interest in compensation." Id. at 16.
126. Id. at 16.
127. MP, opinion of Brennan, J. (Dec. 14, 1984), at 15 n.5. Justice Powell in turn responded, jus-
tifying his distinction between presumed and punitive damages. He acknowledged that his opinion for
the Court in Gertz "did not distinguish between presumed and punitive damages in libel suits involving
public expression." But he explained that he had changed his view "[u]pon the more mature reflection
required by the Court's constitutionalization of the entire law of libel." MP, opinion of Powell, J. (Dec.
21, 1984), at 15 n. 15. In his view, "[t]he purpose of presumed damages is essentially compensatory"
and "[t]his compensatory rationale for allowing presumed damages is wholly different from allowing a
private litigant to punish a defendant by awarding punitive damages without due process of any kind."
Id. at 15-16 n.15.
128. MP, letter of Burger, C.J. (Dec. 20, 1984). As the Marshall papers do not include any docu-
mentation stating Justice Rehnquist's views, it is not clear how the Chief Justice became aware of his
position on punitive damages.
129. MP, letter of Burger, C.J. (Dec. 27, 1984).
130. MP, letter of White, J. (Dec. 26, 1984). Justice White went on, perhaps with some irony, to
end his note to Justice Brennan with a cheerful "Happy New Year." Id.
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volve a matter of public importance.
131
At this point, with only Chief Justice Burger's vote still in play (Justices
Rehnquist and O'Connor were presumptive votes to reverse, given the position
they had taken the previous spring), Justice Powell seemingly saw his opportu-
nity to take the majority away from Justice Brennan. On February 22, 1985,
Justice Powell circulated a redraft of his dissent that directly addressed the
Chief Justice's two stated concerns: his hostility to drawing a distinction be-
tween media and non-media defendants, and his opposition to eliminating pu-
nitive damages. This new draft eliminated both any reference to the "non-
media" status of the defendant and all suggestions that the two categories of
defendant should receive different treatment.' 
32
Most notably for present purposes, Justice Powell also wholly eliminated
his lengthy attack on punitive damages. He replaced it with the following
equivocal statement:
[T]he merit of imposing punitive and presumed damages reasonably may be
doubted in some circumstances. In Gertz, we found that the state interest in
awarding these particular remedies was not "substantial" in view of their effect on
speech at the core of First Amendment concerns. But this case concerns speech of
significantly less constitutional interest. The state interest in these remedies need
not be compellinf to support the incidental effect they may have on this kind of
protected speech. 
3
Justice Powell added that
[t]here is language in Gertz that can be read broadly to the effect that presumed and
punitive damages have no place in the law of defamation. It is necessary, however,
to view this language in the context of the only issue before the Court in that case.
The suit was brought by a private person for a publicly circulated libel on an issue
of general concern. It was the public nature of the libel and its circulation that pri-
marily led the Court to limit recovery to "actual injury." Presumed and punitive
damages were deemed - for the reasons first articulated in New York Times - to
threaten public expression on matters of general concern. Id., at 349-350. No such
threat is present when one party privately libels another by stating that it has filed
for bankruptcy.1
34
Justice Powell therefore concluded that common law rules should not be
131. MP, opinion of White, J. (Jan. 25, 1985), at 3-10. Justice White indicated that he had "be-
come convinced that the Court struck an improvident balance in the New York Times case between the
public's interest in being fully informed about public officials and public affairs and the competing in-
terest of those who have been defamed in vindicating their reputation." Id. at 3. He did suggest, how-
ever, that, "[i]n New York Times, instead of escalating the plaintiff's burden of proof to an almost im-
possible level, we could have achieved our stated goal by limiting the recoverable damages to a level
that would not unduly threaten the press. Punitive damages might be scrutinized as Justice Harlan sug-
gested in Rosenbloom, 403 U.S., at 77, or entirely forbidden as JUSTICE POWELL would have it in this
case." Id. at 7. This observation, shorn of its reference to Justice Powell, survived in his published
opinion. See note 55, supra.
132. MP, opinion of Powell, J. (Feb. 22, 1985), at 1, 3-4, 6-11.
133. Id. at 10-11 (footnote omitted).
134. Id. at 10-11 n.12.
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disturbed in the factual setting of Dun & Bradstreet.135 These changes in his
opinion had the desired effect, at least in part; Justice O'Connor joined the re-
draft on the day that it was circulated 136 and Justice Rehnquist did the same on
March 18.137
In a final attempt to preserve his majority - presumably, by attracting the
vote of Chief Justice Burger, the only member of the Court who was not yet
committed - Justice Brennan circulated a new and substantially rewritten
draft majority opinion on March 20, 1985. In addition to adding a vigorous
defense of New York Times that was aimed at Justice White' 38 and a forceful
rejection of the media/non-media distinction that troubled Chief Justice Bur-
ger, 139 the revision deleted the opinion's sharpest jabs at punitive damages,
substituting language that appeared to allow punitives on a showing of actual
malice."14 But this effort failed. On April 10 Chief Justice Burger circulated a
note indicating (somewhat inconsistently) that he would join both the Powell
and the White opinions. 14  Shortly thereafter the Chief Justice wrote to Pow-
ell, "hereby reassign[ing] the.. .case to you with all the 'pluses' and 'minuses'
that go with it!"'
'42
On May 10, 1985, Justice Powell circulated a revised opinion that now rep-
resented the views of a plurality of the Court. Although the draft was substan-
tially modified in form to reflect its new status as the Court's principal opinion,
in most respects its substance reflected the earlier Powell dissent, turning on
the reduced value of speech that did not involve matters of public concern. 1
43
In one significant area, however, the new opinion did mark a change in course:
it again weakened its critique of punitive damages. It thus eliminated both the
observation that "the merit of imposing punitive and presumed damages may
reasonably be doubted in some circumstances" and the lengthy argument that
Gertz, read in context, stands for the proposition that "presumed and punitive
damages have no place in the law of defamation" when public speech is at is-
135. Id. at 1.
136. MP, letter of O'Connor, J. (Feb. 22, 1985).
137. MP, letter of Rehnquist, J. (Mar. 18, 1985).
138. MP, opinion of Brennan, J. (March 20, 1985), at 5-13.
139. Id. at22-26.
140. Id. at 18 ("we have held that the Constitution requires actual malice as a prerequisite to pre-
sumed and punitive damages because even where the central concerns of New York Times v. Sullivan
are not present the First Amendment demands protection for a vast range of expression"). See id. at 16
(quoting Justice Harlan's opinion in Rosenbloom that "'the First Amendment should be construed to
limit the imposition of punitive damages to those situations in which actual malice is proved"').
141. MP, letter of Burger, C.J. (Apr. 10, 1985). The next day, the Chief Justice indicated that he
planned to add "something along the following line[s]: I join those parts of Justice Powell's opinion
essential to the disposition of the case; I agree generally with Justice White's opinion with respect to
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964)." MP, memorandum to the Conference of Burger, C.J. (Apr. 11, 1985).
142. MP, letter of Burger, C.J. (Apr. 22, 1985).
143. MP, opinion ofPowell, J. (May 10, 1985).
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sue.144 Instead, the redraft added the affirmative and emphatic declaration that
the state interest in awarding presumed and punitive damages "is substantial
relative to the incidental effect these remedies may have on speech of signifi-
cantly less constitutional interest." 145 The reason for this change is unclear and
is not addressed in the Marshall papers; perhaps it was done to attract the Chief
Justice, who wanted to preserve punitive damages and who still had not for-
mally joined the opinion.
There was one more round of changes. Justice Brennan converted his last
draft majority opinion into a dissent.146 Chief Justice Burger decided not to
join either the Powell or the White opinions after all, circulating a brief concur-
rence in the judgment that would have confined Gertz to cases involving
speech on matters of public concern. 147 And Justice Powell modified his
opinion to respond to Justice Brennan. He maintained that Gertz's restrictions
on punitive damages applied only "in cases involving public speech."' 148 And
addressing Justice Brennan's statement that Gertz had labeled the award of pu-
nitive damages "irrelevant" to the legitimate state interest in compensation,
Justice Powell declared that the state interest in awarding punitives "is not sub-
stantial relative to the First Amendment interest in public speech."1 49 With
minor stylistic changes, the opinions were published in this form.
These documents are more than a revealing backstage look at the Court's
decision-making process; they also show that the prospect of eliminating puni-
tive damages in libel cases was a very real one. Four Justices (Brennan, Mar-
shall, Blackmun, and Stevens) - writing in a case involving nonpublic speech
about a private party, the least favorable setting for libel defendants - ex-
pressed the greatest degree of doubt about the legitimacy of punitive awards.
A fifth Justice (Powell) explicitly advocated elimination of punitive damages
in all libel cases. And two more Justices.(Rehnquist and O'Connor) signed on
to an opinion (Powell's draft dissent of February 22, 1985) indicating that pu-
nitive damages "have no place in the law of defamation" when the speech at
issue involves matters of public concern. Indeed, it appears that the various
opinions' criticisms of punitive damages were dropped largely as a matter of
144. Compare id. at 10 with MP, opinion of Powell, J. (Feb. 22, 1985), at 10-11 & n.12.
145. MP, opinion of Powell, J. (May 10, 1985), at 10 (emphasis in original).
146. MP, opinion of Brennan, J. (May 23, 1985). Although the two opinions are very similar in
substance, the dissent made one interesting linguistic change. Justice Brennan's draft majority opinion
stated affirmatively that "we have held that the Constitution requires actual malice as a prerequisite to
presumed and punitive damages." MP, opinion of Brennan, J. (March 20, 1985), at 18. The dissent
eliminated that language and returned to the negative formulation of Gertz, stating that the Constitution
"proscribes the award of presumed and punitive damages on less than a showing of actual malice." MP,
opinion of Brennan, J. (May 23, 1985), at 7. This change eliminated the suggestion that the Court had
expressly permitted punitive awards.
147. MP, opinion of Burger, C.J. (May 23, 1985).
148. MP, opinion of Powell, J. (June 19, 1985), at 7 n.4 (emphasis in original).
149. Id. at 1 n.7 (emphasis in original).
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happenstance, as Justices Brennan and Powell vied for the vote of Chief Justice
Burger. By the time the opinions took their final form in the Court's end-of-
term crunch, the majority's hostility to punitive damages had been obscured.
Of course, none of this proves that the current Justices would be as recep-
tive to a challenge to punitive damages as was a silent majority of the Burger
Court. But the curious history of Dun & Bradstreet offers a sort of empirical
proof that, at a minimum, the argument would not be rejected as absurd.
A More Favorable Climate
That is particularly so because the environment for such a challenge is in
several respects more favorable now than it was at the time of the Dun &
Bradstreet decision. First, in the intervening years the Court has been exposed
repeatedly to examples of enormous and irrational punitive awards outside of
the libel context, 150 a development that eventually led the Court to constitu-
tionalize the entire field of punitive damages. It did so first in Honda Motor
Co. v. Oberg,'51 in which it recognized a procedural due process right to judi-
cial review of the size of punitive judgments, and then in BMW of North
America, Inc. v. Gore,152 where it imposed substantive due process-based
limits on the permissible size of punitive awards. In light of this history, the
Court has surely come to have a greater appreciation for the ways in which, as
it explained in Honda, "[p]unitive damages pose an acute danger of arbitrary
deprivation of property."' 153 Indeed, precluding the award of punitive damages
in public-figure libel cases - which would involve a fairly limited step in an
area that already is comprehensively governed by constitutional rules - would
be far less dramatic than the decision in BMW, which imposed a constitutional
overlay on an entirely new area of state activity.
Second, the nature of punitive awards in libel cases has changed since
Gertz, and even since Dun & Bradstreet: judgments against the press have be-
come substantially larger. Writing contemporaneously with Dun & Bradstreet,
then-Judge Bork - even in his pre-Slouching Towards Gomorrah days, no
patsy for the recognition of new constitutional rights -observed that
Sullivan seems not to have provided in full measure the protection for the
marketplace of ideas that it was designed to do. Instead, in the past few years a
remarkable upsurge in libel actions, accompanied by a startling inflation of
damage awards, has threatened to impose self-censorship on the press which
can as easily inhibit debate and criticism as would overt governmental regula-
150. See, e.g., TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993); Pacific
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
151. 512 U.S. 415 (1994).
152. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
153. 512 U.S. at 432.
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tion that the first amendment most certainly would not permit.
54
Commentators have confirmed this conclusion with more recent empirical
findings, concluding that punitive judgments "continue to escalate alarm-
ingly."'
155
Indeed, while the Court has noted its "concern about punitive damages that
'run wild"' outside the First Amendment setting,' 56 defamation verdicts have
outpaced increases in damages awards returned in areas of nonconstitutional
tort litigation.' 57 Libel verdicts in the early 1980s, for example, were three
times greater than awards in medical malpractice and product liability ac-
tions. 5 8 The most recent data indicate that during the 1990-1998 period the
average punitive libel award was $3,378,926 and the median was $300,00019
- amounts that are, respectively, double and 25% larger than the correspond-
ing figures ($1,647,958 and $250,000) for the 1980-1989 period. 160 For
smaller publications, these are substantial sums.
This change may well move the Court, as it did Judge Bork. Justice
Harlan, for one, several times suggested that the punitive damages question
might have to be revisited if the rules applied by the Court failed to provide
adequate protection for free expression because "when matters are in flux...it
is more important to rethink past conclusions than to adhere to them without
question., 161 Indeed, the Court's decisions in this area, from Butts to Dun &
Bradstreet, have witnessed a remarkable series of vote switches by the Jus-
tices. 162 And as one knowledgeable commentator suggested even before Dun
& Bradstreet, "[b]y now the evidence is surely in. Experience in the [years]
since Gertz has made dramatically clear the threat of punitive damages
awarded at a jury's whim."
163
Third, changes in the composition of the Court since the decision in Dun &
154. Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 996-997 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Bork, J., concurring).
155. Casarez, supra, 32 DUQ. L. REv. at 668.
156. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18.
157. Kaufman, Trends in Damage Awards, Insurance Premiums, and the Cost of Media Libel Liti-
gation, in THE COST OF LIBEL: ECONOMIC AND POLICE IMPLICATIONS (E. Dennis & E. Noam, ed.,
1989))
158. Casarez, supra, 32 DUQ. L. REV. at 682.
159. This amount excludes a $200,000,000 punitive judgment returned in 1997, which would mis-
leadingly inflate the figures.
160. LIBEL DEFENSE RESOURCE CENTER BULL. 4, 30 (Jan. 31, 1999).
161. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 72 n.3 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See id. at 74 (noting value of "further
judicial experience in this area"); id. at 77 (rules he proposed in Rosenbloom were appropriate "given
the present state ofjudicial experience").
162. In addition to Justice Harlan himself, Justice Stewart changed his views on punitive damages
between Butts and Rosenbloom; Justice Powell would have changed his position on punitives between
Gertz and Dun & Bradstreet; Chief Justice Burger moved from the expansive opinion of Justice Bren-
nan in Rosenbloom to the view (expressed in Dun & Bradstreet) that Gertz and New York Times should
be narrowed; and Justice White, who joined New York Times, concluded in Dun & Bradstreet that the
New York Times approach should be abandoned.
163. Lewis, supra, 83 COLUM. L. REV. at 617.
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Bradstreet have produced a group of Justices who are, generally speaking,
open to First Amendment claims. Of the three Justices who remain from Dun
& Bradstreet, Justice Stevens joined Justice. Brennan's opinion, while Justices
Rehnquist and O'Connor were (at least at one point) prepared to sign an opin-
ion that seemingly disapproved the award of punitive damages in public speech
cases. In addition, in the Court's one post-Dun & Bradstreet decision ad-
dressing the substance of a libel plaintiffs burden, Justice O'Connor sided
with the defendant: writing for the Court in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v.
Hepps,164 she concluded that a plaintiff alleging defamation must prove the
falsity of speech about matters of public concern and may not rely on the
common-law presumption that defamatory statements are false. She explained
that a contrary rule would lead to fear of unjustified liability and produce a
"'chilling' effect [that] would be antithetical to the First Amendment's protec-
tion of true speech on matters of public concern," resulting "'in a deterrence of
speech which the Constitution makes free." ' 165 These are the very considera-
tions that would be advanced in a challenge to the constitutionality of punitive
damages in public-figure libel cases.
Of course, Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell - the prin-
cipal advocates of the notion that punitive damages are insupportable in libel
cases - are gone from the Court. But most of the Court's newer Justices have
displayed a degree of sympathy for First Amendment claims. Most suggestive
are the views expressed by Justice Ginsburg. As noted above, while on the
D.C. Circuit she joined then-Judge Bork's observations that juries do not pay
proper attention to First Amendment limits and that New York Times is not
providing adequate protection to libel defendants. But Judges Bork and Gins-
burg went further. They observed (with some prescience where Judge Bork
himself was concerned) that "[t]hose who step into areas of public dispute,
who choose the pleasures and distractions of controversy, must be willing to
bear criticism, disparagement, even wounding assessments."' 166 They accord-
ingly concluded that, "in order to protect a vigorous marketplace in political
ideas and contentions, we ought to accept the proposition that those who place
themselves in a political arena must accept a degree of derogation that others
do not."' 67 And Judges Bork and Ginsburg expressed concern that "the area in
which legal doctrine is currently least adequate to preserve press freedom is the
area of defamation law....Thus, we have a judicial tradition of a continuing
evolution of doctrine to serve the central purpose of the first amendment."'
168
Judge Ginsburg expanded on these views in a subsequent D.C. Circuit libel
164. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
165. Id. at 777 (citation omitted).
166. Olman, 750 F.2d at 993.
167. Id. at 1002.
168. Id. at 995.
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case. Noting that jury confusion and hostility to libel defendants could lead to
unwarranted liability, she opined that trial judges must take special care in
giving instructions regarding libel. She explained:
New York Times v. Sullivan presents a standard that may slip from the grasp of lay
triers unfamiliar with legal concepts and perhaps unsympathetic to publishers who
print statements shown to be false. Careful effort by judges to make the legal rules
genuinely accessible to juries may reduce some of the turbulence in this unsettling
area of the law.169
While this does not speak directly to the punitive damages question dis-
cussed here, it does demonstrate sensitivity to the considerations that would
underlie an assault on punitive awards.
The other Justices have not yet had occasion to address the First Amend-
ment issues posed by libel awards. 170 But without embarking on a comprehen-
sive review of the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence that goes well be-
yond the scope of this essay, it may be noted that Justices Kennedy,1
7 1
Souter,172 and Breyer173 have displayed a willingness to endorse expansive
readings of the First Amendment in a wide variety of contexts. Indeed, even
169. Tavoulareas, 817 F.2d at 807 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
170. Except for Justice Scalia, who demonstrated an unsurprising hostility to claims for expansive
libel protections while on the D.C. Circuit. See Olman, 750 F.2d at 1036 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (con-
tending that "[e]xisting doctrine provides ample protection against the entire list of horribles supposedly
confronting the defenseless modem publicist" and rejecting Judge Bork's reference to "constitutional
,evolution.' in this context).
171. In cases where the Court is divided, Justice Kennedy has been a generally (though not uni-
formly) reliable vote in favor free speech arguments, often writing separately to make the point. Most
notable, perhaps, was his crucial vote striking down statutes that make it a crime to bum the American
flag. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1987). His
other votes demonstrating an expansive First Amendment approach include Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S.
844 (1997) (joining opinion striking down restrictions on indecent Internet communications); Board of
County Commissioners v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996) (joining opinion that prohibited retaliatory dis-
charge of independent contractor); O'Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712 (1996)
(writing Court's opinion prohibiting retaliatory discharge of independent contractor); McIntyre v. Ohio
Election Comm"n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (joining opinion that invalidates prohibition of anonymous cam-
paign literature); United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995) (joining
opinion that invalidates honoraria ban on certain government employees); Ibanez v. Florida Dept. of
Business and Professional Regulation, 512 U.S. 136 (1994) (joining opinion that invalidates prohibition
on commercial advertising); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993) (writing opinion for the Court that
invalidates commercial speech restriction); Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 560 (1993) (writ-
ing dissent arguing that forfeiture of bookstore's entire inventory when a portion is obscene violates the
First Amendment); R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (joining opinion invalidating ban on
hate speech); Forsyth Coutny v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992) (joining opinion invalidat-
ing a parade permit fee); Austin v. Michigan Secretary of State, 494 U.S. 652, 695 (1990) (dissenting
from opinion upholding limits on corporate political expenditures); FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493
U.S. 215, 223 (1990) (opinion of O'Connor, J.) (joining opinion invalidating licensing requirement for
adult bookstores); Riley v. National Federation for the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (joining opinion in-
validating limits on fundraising fees).
172. Like Justice Kennedy, Justice Souter has been a generally reliable vote in favor of First
Amendment claims in cases where the Court is divided. He joined the same opinions as Justice Ken-
nedy in Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr, OHare Truck Service, Inc. v. City of Northlake,
McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm "n, United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, Ibanez v.
Florida Dept. of Business & Professional Regulation, Edenfield v. Fane, Alexander v. United States,
R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, and Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement. In addition, Justice Souter en-
dorsed expansive approaches to the First Amendment in Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521
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of the First Amendment in a wide variety of contexts. Indeed, even Justices
Scalia and Thomas, surely the members of the Court who are least likely to
find that a settled common-law practice violates the Constitution, have offered
some surprisingly broad readings of the First Amendment. 174 Needless to say,
all of these decisions are so far afield from the issue discussed here that it is
impossible to predict how this group of Justices would resolve the constitu-
tionality of punitive awards in public-figure libel actions. But the votes in
these cases do offer some reason to believe that, at the least, a substantial ma-
jority of Justices would not reflexively reject a challenge to such awards.
IV. CONCLUSION
The salient characteristics of punitive damages litigation in public-figure
libel cases are beyond reasonable dispute. There can be no doubt that jurors
who misunderstand or ignore their instructions will, with some frequency, re-
turn punitive awards that are either excessive or wholly unwarranted. There is
no denying that the elasticity of punitive damages permits juries to award
enormous judgments that are not rationally tied either to objective elements of
the defendant's conduct or to the size of the plaintiff's injury. It is apparent
that some juries will use this power to punish distasteful views and unpopular
speakers, a danger that is most acute in cases involving public speech about
(often popular) public figures. And human nature being what it is, it is inevi-
table that this prospect will make speakers more cautious about what they are
willing to say lest they face unpredictable and potentially ruinous liability - a
prospect that is not entirely vitiated by the availability of limited judicial re-
U.S. 457, 477 (1997) (writing dissent that would have invalidated compelled contributions to finance
advertisements), Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Board, 502 U.S. 105 (1991)
("Son of Sam law" unconstitutional), and Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 676 (1991) (writ-
ing dissent arguing that the First Amendment precludes promissory estoppel claims against media).
173. Although Justice Breyer does not have a long track record on the Court, he is shaping up as a
generally reliable vote for expansive First Amendment positions. He voted with Justice Kennedy in
Reno v. ACLU, Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr, O'Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. City of
Northlake, McIntyre v. Ohio Board of Elections, and United States v. National Treasury Employees
Union. Then-Judge Breyer joined two unexceptional opinions finding for a defamation or libel plaintiff
while on the First Circuit, but neither sheds much light on his approach to the First Amendment. See
Phantom Touring, Inc. v. Affiliated Publications, 953 F.2d 724 (1 st Cir. 1992); Geiger v. Dell Publish-
ing Co., 719 F.2d 515 (1st Cir. 1983).
174. Both joined the Court's opinion in Reno v. ACLU and Justice Souter's dissent in Glickman v.
Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc. Both also joined the dissenting opinion in Turner Broadcasting System,
Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997), which argued that deference to Congress did not require rejection of a
First Amendment challenge to cable regulation. In addition, Justice Scalia joined the Court's (or plural-
ity) opinions in Ibanez v. Florida Dept. of Business & Professional Regulation, Edenfield v. Fane, and
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Board, wrote the Court's opinion in R.A. V. v.
City of St. Paul, and dissented in Austin v. Michigan Secretary of State. Justice Thomas, meanwhile,
has taken an absolutest approach that would subject many regulations of commercial speech to strict
scrutiny. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 518 (1996) (opinion of Thomas,
J.). But having said all of this, the prospect that either of these Justices actually would vote to invalidate
punitive damages in a category of libel cases might charitably be characterized as remote.
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view.
When the issue is stated in these (admittedly loaded) terms, the question
whether punitive awards in public-figure libel cases are constitutionally prob-
lematic answers itself. Since New York Times, the Court's First Amendment
libel doctrine has been premised on the notion that an area of "breathing space"
for speakers must be maintained. As a consequence, the zeal with which false
statements are challenged must be tempered by rules that prevent fear of liabil-
ity from discouraging valuable public debate, a consideration that is most pow-
erful when the speech is on a matter of public interest and concerns a public
figure. Against this background, the award of punitive damages - which con-
stitute a windfall for the plaintiff and avowedly are intended to discourage fu-
ture speech - should be insupportable.
Despite the importance of the issue, it has been fifteen years since the Su-
preme Court last addressed the rules governing damages in libel actions (in
Dun & Bradstreet), more than twenty-five years since it considered libel li-
ability rules in a case involving speech on matters of public concern (in Gertz),
and more than thirty years since it faced the issue in a case involving a public
figure (in the since-discredited Butts). But while the Court's doctrine has not
changed since Dun & Bradstreet, the world certainly has: the dangers of puni-
tive damages have become more apparent as a general matter, and the press in
particular has been buffeted by escalating punitive awards. How the Court
would react to these changes were it presented with the issue is no sure thing.
Libel defendants, however, may find some hope in a noted jurist's rhetorical
question, which asked "if, over time, the libel action becomes a threat to the
central meaning of the first amendment, why should judges not adjust their
doctrines?"' 175 It is noteworthy that the speaker posing that question was not
Justice Brennan, Marshall, or Blackmun; it was Judge Bork. This essay sug-
gests that, so far as punitive awards in public-figure libel cases are concerned,
it is time for the Supreme Court to answer Judge Bork's question.
175. Olman, 750 F.2d at 995 (Bork, J., concurring).
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